The Telecommunications Threat: How Iran Could Widen the Theater of War
Image: Undersea fiber optic cables in the Red Sea
On February 24th, 2024, internet connectivity across the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of Europe slowed considerably or dropped entirely. Millions of dollars in financial transactions were lost, trade in the Gulf was interrupted, and emergency services began rerouting internet traffic. The cause? Houthi forces in Yemen had fired at the UK-owned cargo ship the Rubymar in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which dragged its anchor across the seabed before sinking. Three underwater fiber optic cables were seriously damaged, including the AAE-1, Seacom/Tata, and EIG, which link Southeast Asia, India, the Middle East, East Africa, and Europe. This incident may be repeated in the coming months.
The Bab al-Madeb Strait represents a serious chokepoint of global communications. Over 17% of all global internet traffic, and roughly 90% of data capacity between Europe and Asia, flows through a part of the Strait only ten miles wide (the Large Strait). To the west of the Strait is Djibouti, embroiled in regional and internal security issues. To the east is the Houthi-controlled Mayun Island, Hanish Islands, and the port city of Mocha, allowing the Iran-backed militia to use short-range missiles and unmanned surface vessels to target vessels in the Strait with ease.
A key problem is that these cables are fairly easy to damage. They’re less than 200 meters underwater and not protected by any comprehensive federal strategy. The US relies on military presence in the region as a deterrent to secure them, but international treaties governing the issue are outdated and ill-equipped to handle the high connectivity stakes that these cables represent.
That's compounded by the issue that these submarine cables are extraordinarily difficult to repair. The Department of Homeland Security has announced a priority to develop reliable repair capacity, but as of now, there are only 63 cable repairships globally. Five of them are operable worldwide. Five of them are stationed in the Middle East, owned by the United Arab Emirates. And only one, which is based in Portland, Oregon and nearing retirement, is owned and operated by the United States.
Meanwhile, maintenance-response practices require ships to get “access rights” if the damaged cable is within a 200-mile radius of a sovereign coastline. Actually repairing the cable costs over $1 million per repair, and takes around forty days on average. This timeline and administrative process is obviously unattainable in an active conflict site such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab al-Mandeb.
As the war with the US and Israel enters its ninth month, Iran has several options for widening the theater of war on the telecommunications front. First, they could damage the seven submarine cables that run under the Strait of Hormuz, where Tehran has proven to wield considerable capabilities. However, less than 1% of international bandwidth traverses the Strait of Hormuz, mainly connecting Gulf partners with each other. The Bab al-Mandeb, however, presents a more desirable telecommunications target. As the second option, Iran could work through their proxy network in Yemen, the Houthis, to damage or sever submarine cables in the Red Sea.
This isn’t theoretical: Iran has promised to do as much. Two senior Iranian security officials told Reuters that should the US resume strikes against Iran after the US midterm elections, “there will be no red lines.” They reportedly have “detailed plans” for attacking submarine cables, and would also aim to prevent cable repairs to continue the disruption as long as possible.
If American strikes commence after the midterm elections, which seems likely given current US force posture in the region, and Iranian or Houthi forces damage the undersea cables in the Bab el-Mandeb in retaliation, the effects will be immediate. Severing these cables would force global internet traffic to reroute through longer, congested paths, causing severe internet slowdowns across the Middle East, South Asia, and parts of Europe. Digital operations like international financial transactions, e-commerce, and cloud computing would glitch or temporarily fail.
Tehran’s threat to damage the submarine cables is intended to deter the United States and Israel from further actions in the war. This is admittedly a risky move for Iran– it would further isolate them in the region, significantly damage their own economy, and escalate the war. But in a war where Iran has been targeting chokepoints over troops, it seems likely that they will be willing to accept less relative pain than their neighbors and American counterparts.
It is unlikely that Washington will heed Iranian threats, so to prepare for possible attacks on submarine cables, the United States should invest in detection technology and repair infrastructure immediately, working with allies in the Gulf and the Red Sea. To detect possible attacks, the US needs to incorporate Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) technology within the fiber optic cables to act as an early warning system for potential attack. This would alert forces in the region to potential disruption, and allow for faster repair. In order to repair the cables, however, the US would need to commit to significantly upgrading the repair ships, while working with private contractors, allies, and regional partners to create a strong presence in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Ultimately, the United States cannot control how Tehran chooses to widen the war– only how prepared the US infrastructure is in response.
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